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PATENTS, HIDDEN NOVELTY, AND FOOD SAFETY
Jeanette M. Roorda*
Abstract
This Note discusses how federal agency policy results in a lack of
access to patent-protected genetically modified organisms (GMOs) for
independent food safety testing. The U.S. GMO policy is a combination
of biotechnology regulations and biotechnology intellectual property
protections. Intellectual property protection for the developers of new
organisms has increased as the technology has advanced from manual
pollination to genetic modification methods. Initially the only protection
available was in the form of trade secrets, but the protection has increased
incrementally to now include full utility patent protection. This Note
evaluates the interactions between U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) GMO policy and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) GMO
policy by comparing USPTO and FDA treatment of various human
consumption products. GMO food products fall into a narrow “hidden
novelty” exception created by the combination of the FDA’s GMO policy
and the GMO manufacturers’ use of licensing enabled by utility patent
protection. This Note emphasizes the necessity of access to human
consumption products for independent safety testing and illustrates this
necessity through a comparison to trans fats. Finally, this Note proposes
a narrow research exemption to correct the “hidden novelty” exception
while leaving patent law precedent undisturbed.
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INTRODUCTION
Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are a growing part of the
U.S. food supply. Biotechnology is rapidly advancing and potentially
solving the many challenges of feeding the world’s growing population.
The United States embraces innovation by allowing Congress “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.”1 Fantastic new
discoveries come with many unknowns, and uncertainty is inherent in
scientific discoveries. GMOs are no exception; they come with many
potential benefits as well as many potential concerns.
One way Congress fulfills the constitutional mandate “[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and the useful Arts” is by issuing utility patents
to secure “for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”2 A utility patent is intended
to grant the owner “the right to exclude others from making, using,
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States”
for the term of the patent.3 In exchange for the inventor’s limited
monopoly, the public receives the benefit of the invention itself and the
knowledge gained through the invention.
GMOs have the potential to provide great benefits to the public. The
potential benefits of GMOs include a more nutritious and abundant food
supply for not only the United States but also the world.4 Genetic
1.
2.
3.
4.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2012).
See JEFF SIMMONS, TECHNOLOGY’S ROLE
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modifications to food organisms can result in faster growth rates,
increased yields, improved nutrition content, pest resistance, weed
resistance, disease resistance, and other beneficial characteristics.5 The
development of such a potentially beneficial invention should be
promoted, but at the same time, potential concerns must be adequately
addressed.
The concerns regarding GMOs are related to their possible impact on
human health and the environment. In the United States, the majority of
processed foods contain at least one GMO ingredient.6 Therefore, any
adverse latent health effects from GMOs could have a widespread
detrimental effect on the U.S. population. Additionally, because GMOs
are living organisms, when a GMO is introduced into the environment,
the genetically modified trait can spread into other related species through
pollination or sexual reproduction.7 Once a genetic modification has
spread, it could be difficult or impossible to remove. While the risk of
these concerns may be low, the severity of the potential impact warrants
adequate research.
Many scholars have explored the various concerns surrounding
GMOs. For example, Professor Mary Jane Angelo has analyzed the U.S.
regulatory framework for GMOs.8 Professors Lars Noah9 and Katharine
Van Tassel10 have provided contrasting views related to tort liability
concerns for GMOs. The concept of IP overreach, identified by Professor
Elizabeth Rowe, provided the inspiration for this Note.11
This Note explores the U.S. regulatory framework for GMOs and the
underlying policies for protecting the intellectual property of the
developers of new organisms. It focuses on the interaction between U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) GMO policy and Food and Drug
AFFORDABLE
AND
ABUNDANT
FOOD
A
GLOBAL
REALITY
7
(2011),
https://www.ncbiotech.org/sites/default/files/pages/Three-Rights-White-Paper-Revised.pdf.
5. Weighing the GMO Arguments: For, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.fao.org/english/newsroom/focus/2003/gmo7.htm (last visited June 25, 2016).
6. See Genetically Modified Foods, GENETIC SCI. LEARNING CTR. (June 22, 2014),
http://learn.genetics.utah.edu/content/science/gmfoods/.
7. See R.L. Nielsen, Minimizing Pollen Drift & Commingling of GMO and Non-GMO
Corn Grain, CHAT N’ CHEW CAFE (Mar. 2000), http://www.kingcorn.org/news/articles.00/GMO
_Issues000307.html.
8. Mary Jane Angelo, Regulating Evolution for Sale: An Evolutionary Biology Model for
Regulating the Unnatural Selection of Genetically Modified Organisms, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
93 (2007) (proposing a new evolutionary biology model for regulating GMOs).
9. Lars Noah, Managing Biotechnology’s [R]evolution: Has Guarded Enthusiasm
Become Benign Neglect?, 11 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2006) (warning against inappropriate legal
action and overregulation of new technology).
10. Katharine Van Tassel, The Introduction of Biotech Foods to the Tort System: Creating
a New Duty to Identify, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1645 (2004).
11. Elizabeth A. Rowe, Patents, Genetically Modified Foods, and IP Overreaching, 64
SMU L. REV. 859 (2011).
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Administration (FDA) GMO policy. This Note identifies a “hidden
novelty” exception and discusses how this exception allows
manufacturers to use the protective power of a utility patent to create a
monopoly on the safety research of GMOs in the U.S. food supply.
Finally, it explores why access to GMOs for independent food safety
testing is a necessity and suggests a solution.
This Note presents its argument in four Parts. Part I explains the
history of U.S. GMO policy, beginning with a description of the U.S.
regulatory framework for biotechnology. Next, Part I explores the
increasing levels of intellectual property protection available to the
developers of new organisms. Part I provides the underlying logic that
defines GMO policy.
Part II discusses the interaction between USPTO GMO policy and
FDA GMO policy. It defines the roles of the USPTO and the FDA as well
as identifies the purpose and responsibilities of each agency for GMO
food products. Additionally, Part II explores examples to compare and
highlight the varying treatment of different food products by the USPTO
and the FDA.
Part III explains how independent researchers do not have access to
GMOs for food safety testing as a result of the interaction of FDA policy
and utility patent protection. Part III describes how the protective power
of a utility patent and licensing restrictions shield from independent
safety testing GMOs used as an ingredient or component of a processed
food product, creating a narrow exception that this Note refers to as the
special “hidden novelty” exception. The same protective power and
licensing restrictions extend the monopoly of the manufacturer to include
a monopoly on safety research of the patented GMO food product.
Part IV asserts the necessity of access to GMOs for independent
research. It explores lessons from the history of trans fat—another manmade food product with many novel and useful characteristics—in the
U.S. food supply. Part IV argues that patent policy should remain intact
and that the FDA should enact regulations that create access to GMOs for
independent research. This is the best solution to correct the special
“hidden novelty” exception because it ensures that all food products in
the U.S. food supply can be independently tested for safety without
disturbing relevant patent law precedent.
GMO manufacturers combine the power of patent license protection
with FDA policy to create a lack of access to GMO food products for
independent food safety testing.12 All other food products in the U.S. food
supply are accessible for independent testing because they either lack
patent protection, are sold rather than licensed, or can be easily identified
12. See Do Seed Companies Control GM Crop Research?, SCI. AM. (July 20, 2009), http://
www.scientificamerican.com/article/do-seed-companies-control-gm-crop-research/ [hereinafter
Seed Companies].
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and isolated. Should a manufacturer be able to obtain utility patent
protection, based on the novel and useful characteristics of a GMO that
distinguish it from its non-modified counterpart, and then use the utility
patent protection to prohibit any independent safety testing of the GMO
as a food product?
I. THE HISTORY OF U.S. GMO POLICY
Genetic modification of living organisms is a relatively new
technological advancement. Congress has not passed any specialized
legislation for GMOs.13 As a result, the existing general statutory
framework regulates GMOs.14 Three federal agencies are responsible for
the majority of GMO regulation issues: the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA), the FDA, and the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).15 This Part provides a brief overview of how the
regulatory responsibility for GMOs is spread across these federal
agencies. It also describes the increasing levels of intellectual property
protection that developers of new organisms have received.
A. Regulating Biotechnology
In 1986, the Office of Science and Technology Policy announced “the
policy of the federal agencies involved with the review of biotechnology
research and products” in the Coordinated Framework for Regulation of
Biotechnology (Coordinated Framework).16 The Coordinated
Framework integrates multiple agencies’ regulations to cover all forms
of biotechnology.17 It details the federal regulatory policy intended to
ensure the safety of biotechnology research and products.18 Rather than
create policy specific to GMOs, Congress determined that the existing
statutory frameworks provide “adequate [regulation] to ensure health and
environmental safety while maintaining sufficient regulatory flexibility
to avoid impeding the growth of an infant industry.”19
Under the existing statutory framework, a product’s use determines
which federal agency has jurisdiction over that product, including
13. See LUIS ACOSTA, RESTRICTIONS ON GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS: UNITED
STATES, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/restrictions-on-gmos/usa.php (last updated June 9, 2015).
14. See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302,
23,302–03 (June 26, 1986).
15. Id. at 23,303–06; ACOSTA, supra note 13; Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience,
Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis in the Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants and
Animals, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2167, 2216–17 (2004).
16. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23,302.
17. Id. at 23,302–03.
18. Id.; see also Mandel, supra note 15, at 2216 (outlining the intentions behind the federal
regulatory policy).
19. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23,302–03.
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GMOs.20 The FDA has jurisdiction over foods, food additives, human
drugs, biologics and devices, and animal drugs.21 The USDA’s Food
Safety Inspection Service has jurisdiction over domestic livestock and
poultry.22 The USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service has
jurisdiction over the shipment or release of animal biologics and plant
pests.23 The EPA has jurisdiction over pesticides, including organisms
genetically modified to produce their own pesticide.24
The Coordinated Framework recognizes that as scientific knowledge
and understanding of possible risks of biotechnology increases,
modification to the regulatory framework may be necessary.25 The
Coordinated Framework carefully notes that “there always can be
potential problems and deficiencies in the regulatory apparatus in a fast
moving field.”26 However, the Coordinated Framework has remained—
without modification—the regulatory framework for biotechnology
products since its establishment in 1986.27
The current statutory framework regulating GMOs is no longer
adequate to ensure health and environmental safety. The current
framework is deficient because it allows GMO manufacturers to use
licensing restrictions to prevent access to GMO food products for
independent food safety testing.28 Under the current framework, GMO
manufacturers, who profit financially from the inclusion of GMOs in the
U.S. food supply, have sole control of the safety testing of their
products.29 This does not sufficiently ensure that the manufacturer’s
financial profit concerns will not overshadow health and environmental
safety concerns. Federal agency policy must address these shortcomings
to reduce the potential risk of any health and environmental harms while
ensuring the intellectual property rights of manufacturers are protected.
B. Protecting the Developers of New Food Plants
A growing population requires a growing food supply. Throughout
history, mankind has sought better ways to produce food. As the history
of agricultural advancements demonstrates, the level of intellectual
20. See id. at 23,303; Mandel, supra note 15, at 2216–17.
21. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23,304.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 23,304–05.
25. Id. at 23,302, 23,306.
26. Id. at 23,306.
27. See Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984,
22,989–90 (May 29, 1992); Food from Genetically Engineered Plants, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceResearch/GEPlants/default.htm (last updated
Nov. 19, 2015).
28. See Seed Companies, supra note 12.
29. Id.
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property protection has increased as more technology is employed with
advancements.30 The purpose of providing intellectual property
protection to plants is to encourage the development of novel varieties
with the end result of promoting agriculture in the public interest.31
However, another purpose emerged when the USPTO introduced utility
patents as intellectual property protection for GMOs. GMO
manufacturers are now combining licensing with FDA policy to maintain
full control and oversight of any safety testing of GMO food products.32
This new purpose of preventing independent safety research conflicts
with the fundamental purpose of promoting agriculture in the public
interest. An overview of the history of intellectual property protection
given to plants highlights the fundamental connection of intellectual
property protection to the promotion of agriculture in the public interest.
1. Trade Secrets
The first advances in seed development were made through manual
pollination.33 In manual pollination, the seed producer selects two parent
plants from different plant lines and cross-pollinates the parent plants.34
The goal of manual pollination is to develop a plant with a combination
of desired characteristics not exhibited in either of the parent plant lines.35
The seed developed through this process is called a hybrid seed.36
Typically, hybrid seeds only produce plants with the desired
characteristics in the first generation of seed.37 Subsequent generations of
seed resulting from open pollination develop “inconsistent and
undesirable characteristics.”38
The initial intellectual property protection for agricultural
biotechnology came in the form of trade secret protection for hybrid
seeds.39 The hybrid seeds have built-in protection for the seed producer.40
Because hybrid seeds are only useful for the first generation, seed
30. See Rowe, supra note 11, at 862.
31. See Plant Variety Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542, 1542 (1970)
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2583 (2012)), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE P LANT VARIETY PROTECTION ACT (1974); 8 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 24.03
(2014).
32. See Seed Companies, supra note 12.
33. Rowe, supra note 11, at 863.
34. Theresa Friday, Heirloom or hybrid tomatoes, which to choose?, UNIV. OF FLA. IFAS
EXTENSION SANTA ROSA (Mar. 13, 2012), http://santarosa.ifas.ufl.edu/blog/2012/03/13/heirloomor-hybrid-tomatoes-which-to-choose/.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Rowe, supra note 11, at 863. See Friday, supra note 34.
39. Rowe, supra note 11, at 862.
40. Id. at 863. See Friday, supra note 34.
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producers can sell the first generation hybrid seed and do not have to be
concerned about losing market share through the use or sale of the
subsequent generations of seed produced by the buyer.41 The seed
producer can continue to profit each year with the sale of the first
generation hybrid seeds by keeping the parent lines as a trade secret and
only selling the first-generation hybrid seeds.42 Independent parties are
simply unable to reproduce a plant with the same characteristics using
subsequent generations of the seed.
2. Plant Patent Act of 1930
The first patent protection for plants came when Congress passed the
Townsend–Purnell Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA).43 The intent behind
the PPA was “to afford agriculture, so far as practicable, the same
opportunity to participate in the benefits of the patent system as has been
given industry.”44 The USPTO administers plant patents for those plants
that meet the PPA’s specifications.45 The PPA provides protection solely
for plants asexually reproduced that also meet the general patent
eligibility requirements of novelty, originality, and nonobviousness.46
The asexual reproduction requirement means the plant must be
reproduced by means such as cuttings or grafting and not by seeds.47
A plant patent is only infringed when others asexually reproduce the
plant.48 Therefore, the use of seeds to sexually reproduce a plant protected
under the PPA does not constitute infringement.49 Additionally, another
plant producer is free to independently breed a similar variety.50 Nothing
restricts independent parties from growing or conducting research on any
seeds produced by the plants; they are simply prohibited from asexually
reproducing the plant. Thus, protection under the PPA is typically only
beneficial for a plant variety that can only be reproduced asexually or is
very difficult to reproduce sexually.51 The purpose of intellectual
property protection under the PPA is to encourage the preservation of a
unique plant with desirable characteristics by providing a financial
incentive to individuals who undertake the effort to preserve and
asexually propagate a plant that would otherwise cease to exist when the
parent plant died.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Rowe, supra note 11, at 863. See Friday, supra note 34.
See Rowe, supra note 11, at 863.
Pub. L. No. 245, 46 Stat. 376 (1930); CHISUM, supra note 31, § 24.02(1).
CHISUM, supra note 31, § 24.02(1) (quoting S. REP. NO. 71-315 (1930)).
Id. § 24.01.
Id. § 24.02(2).
Id. § 24.02(2)(b).
Id. § 24.01.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 24.02.
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3. Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970
Sexually reproduced plants did not receive any additional protection
until Congress passed the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 (PVPA).52
The PVPA provides protection for plants whose seeds produced heritable
traits that are consistent and desirable through not only the first
generation of seed but also in subsequent generations of seed.53 The
purpose of the PVPA is “[t]o encourage the development of novel
varieties of sexually reproduced plants and to make them available to the
public, providing protection available to those who breed, develop, or
discover them, and thereby promoting progress in agriculture in the
public interest.”54 A developer of a novel variety of plant who acquires a
certificate of protection under the PVPA has the exclusive right for the
patent term to “exclude others from selling the variety, or offering it for
sale, or reproducing it, or importing it, or exporting it, or using it in
producing . . . a hybrid or different variety therefrom.”55
Although the PVPA provides protection similar to patent protection,
the protection is distinctly different in two critical aspects.56 First, the
PVPA authorizes the USDA to issue certificates of plant variety
protection (PVP certificates) rather than authorizing the USPTO to issue
a patent.57 Second, the PVPA provides exemptions for activities that
could otherwise constitute infringement under a patent.58 Two important
exemptions are the research exemption and the crop exemption.59 The
research exemption states that “[t]he use and reproduction of a protected
variety for plant breeding or other bona fide research shall not constitute
an infringement of the protection provided under this chapter.”60 The crop
exemption originally allowed farmers to save seed for replanting their
own crops and to sell limited quantities of saved seed to others for

52. Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542, 1542 (1970) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
§§ 2321–2583).
53. 7 U.S.C. § 2541 (2012).
54. 84 Stat. at 1542.
55. 7 U.S.C. § 2483.
56. An interesting third distinct difference is beyond the scope of this Note. The PVPA
allows a protected variety to be “open to use on a basis of equitable remuneration to the owner,
not less than a reasonable royalty" if necessary "to insure an adequate supply of fiber, food, or
feed in this country.” Id. § 2404. This provision protects the U.S. food supply by allowing the
USDA to force the owner of a protected plant variety to allow the use of the protected variety at
a reasonable price to ensure an adequate supply of food is available. See CHISUM, supra note 31,
§ 24.03(4)(a)(i).
57. 7 U.S.C. § 2323.
58. Id. §§ 2542–2545.
59. Id. § 2543 (Crop Exemption); id. § 2544 (Research Exemption). See Rowe, supra note
11, at 864–65.
60. 7 U.S.C. § 2544.
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replanting.61 However, in 1994, Congress amended the PVPA to
eliminate the ability of farmers to sell saved seed to others for replanting,
but it “[c]ontinues to allow farmers to save seed for replanting on their
own farm.”62
4. Utility Patents for Plants
The possibility of plants receiving the full protection of a utility patent
arose with the landmark Supreme Court decision in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty.63 Chakrabarty involved the patent eligibility of a bacteria
that was genetically modified to be capable of breaking down crude oil.64
The question before the Supreme Court was “whether a live, humanmade micro-organism is patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.”65 The Supreme Court found that the “claim is not to
a[n] . . . unknown natural phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occurring
manufacture or composition of matter—a product of human ingenuity
‘having a distinctive name, character [and] use.’”66 Additionally, the
Supreme Court observed that the applicant “ha[d] produced a new
bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any found in
nature and one having the potential for significant utility. His discovery
is not nature’s handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable
subject matter under § 101.”67 The Court held that genetically modified
bacteria is patent-eligible subject matter, opening the door for the
possibility of full utility patent protection for plants.68
In October 2001, the Supreme Court clarified any doubt as to whether
sexually reproducing plants are patent-eligible subject matter.69 In J.E.M.
Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., the Supreme Court
considered whether “utility patents may be issued for plants under 35
U.S.C. § 101” or if “the Plant Variety Protection Act and the Plant Patent
Act of 1930 are the exclusive means of obtaining a federal statutory right
to exclude others from reproducing, selling, or using plants or plant
varieties.”70 J.E.M. Ag Supply involved the validity of utility patents
covering the manufacture and use of Pioneer’s inbred and hybrid corn
seed products.71 The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s reliance
61. See CHISUM, supra note 31, § 24.03(b)(ii).
62. H.R. REP. 103-349, at 11 (1994).
63. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
64. Id. at 305.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 309–10 (alteration in original) (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609,
615 (1887)).
67. Id. at 310.
68. See id. at 318.
69. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 130 (2001).
70. Id. at 127 (citations omitted).
71. Id.
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on Chakrabarty’s broad construction of § 101 and held that the subject
matter covered by § 101 clearly included plant life.72 The Court observed
that “advances in biological knowledge and breeding expertise have
allowed plant breeders to satisfy § 101’s demanding description
requirement.”73 The Court also noted that “Congress ha[d] not only failed
to pass legislation indicating that it disagree[d] with the [US]PTO’s
interpretation of § 101 [that plants are patent-eligible subject matter]; it
has even recognized the availability of utility patents for plants.”74
The decision in J.E.M. Ag Supply is where the current state of
intellectual property protection for plants remains. If a plant meets the
patent criteria of utility, novelty, and nonobviousness, it can receive the
full protection of a utility patent.75 A key difference is that the PPA and
PVPA allow farmers to save their seeds for replanting and do not prohibit
research.76 A utility patent provides increased protection and gives the
patent holder the power to exclude others from both saving their seeds
for replanting and conducting research with the patented plant.77
II. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN USPTO GMO POLICY AND FDA GMO
POLICY
To analyze how USPTO GMO policy and FDA GMO policy interact,
this Part begins by defining each agency’s role. It then explains the
underlying policy goals and the overall functions and responsibilities of
each agency. An understanding of the purpose of each agency’s actions
again highlights the deficiency in the existing statutory framework.
Examples comparing the varying treatment of different food products by
the USPTO and the FDA illustrate this deficiency.
A. Defining the Roles of the USPTO and the FDA
The USPTO and the FDA each have a separate and distinct role in
U.S. GMO policy. The underlying policy considerations shed light on the
unique roles that both the USPTO and the FDA play. Examining the
overall functions and responsibilities of each agency clarifies the
agency’s role in GMO policy. The USPTO’s role centers on granting
patents which provide intellectual property protection. The FDA’s role
centers on ensuring the safety of the food supply and human health.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 129.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 145.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2012).
See 7 U.S.C. § 2541(a) (2012).
See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1).
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1. The Progress of Science
The USPTO serves to meet the constitutional mandate “[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.”78 At a basic level, the USPTO’s impact on GMO policy
is to “grant patents for the protection of inventions.”79 Granting patents
meets the constitutional mandate by promoting scientific progress
“[t]hrough the preservation, classification, and dissemination of patent
information” and by securing inventors exclusive rights to their
discoveries for the limited term of the patent.80 The USPTO evaluates
each patent application under statutory provisions for subject matter
eligibility as well as utility, novelty, and nonobviousness.81
The USPTO evaluates subject matter eligibility and utility under 35
U.S.C. § 101.82 The statutory language provides that “[w]hoever invents
or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor.”83 GMOs are patent-eligible subject matter under
the Supreme Court precedent in Chakrabarty and J.E.M. Ag Supply.84
Chakrabarty held that a living organism is patentable subject matter,85
and J.E.M. Ag Supply affirmed that plants, both asexually and sexually
reproducing, are patent-eligible subject matter for utility patents.86 The
utility for a GMO comes from the desirable trait incorporated into the
GMO through genetic modification.87 For example, a plant genetically
modified to produce its own pesticide is a useful invention because of this
new ability to repel insects.88 Some possible utilities for GMO food
products include faster growth rates, increased yields, resistance to pests
and weeds, and decreased need for water.89
78. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
79. Functions of the Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/function.htm (last updated Nov. 14, 2015).
80. Id.
81. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103. Each patent application is also evaluated for formalities,
written description, enablement, best mode, and other requirements, however, those are beyond
the scope of this Note. See MPEP Ch. 700 (9th ed., Mar. 2014) (providing guidance on the USPTO
procedures for examination of applications).
82. See id. § 101.
83. See id.
84. See supra Subsection I.B.4.
85. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980).
86. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 146 (2001).
87. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313.
88. See U.S. Patent No. 6,340,593 col. 3 l. 36–40 (filed Oct. 21, 1999) (issued Jan. 22, 2002)
(exemplifying plant-optimized polynucleotides encoding approximately 15 kDa and
approximately 45 kDa pesticidal proteins).
89. E.g., Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 169 (D.D.C. 2000).
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After evaluating a GMO patent application for subject matter
eligibility and utility, the USPTO evaluates the claimed invention for
novelty and nonobviousness.90 Novelty requires that the invention has not
been “anticipated” by any prior art; in other words, the claimed GMO
must be new.91 A GMO will pass the novelty requirement unless it can
be shown that the GMO is not a new invention.92 Additionally, the
nonobviousness requirement is likely the most challenging requirement a
GMO faces. The statutory language provides as follows:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained . . . if
the differences between the claimed invention and the prior
art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have
been obvious . . . to a person having ordinary skill in the art
to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall
not be negated by the manner in which the invention was
made.93
For a claimed invention of a GMO, the USPTO must determine if it
would have been obvious to a person skilled in the art to combine the
elements from the prior art to create the claimed invention.94 A detailed
analysis of the multiple variations of nonobviousness analysis possible
for GMOs is beyond the scope of this Note.
The critical point to observe is that the more unnatural the genetic
modification combination is, the more likely it is that the combination
will be found nonobvious. The more likely it is that the combination is
nonobvious, the more likely it is that the GMO will receive the protection
of a utility patent. As genetic modification technology becomes
increasingly common, there will likely be more patent application
rejections based on “obviousness.” This possibility encourages GMO
developers to make “less obvious” genetic combinations to obtain patent
protection. “Less obvious” combinations will likely involve more
transgenic GMOs and less intragenic GMOs.95 For example, it might be
obvious to genetically modify a red tomato with genes from a green
tomato to increase bruising resistance, but it might be “less obvious” to
90. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103 (2012).
91. MPEP § 2131 (9th ed., Mar. 2014) (providing guidance on how to analyze a patent
application under 35 U.S.C. § 102).
92. See id.
93. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
94. See MPEP §§ 2141–2144 (providing guidance on how to analyze a patent application
under 35 U.S.C. § 103).
95. Transgenic GMOs involve genetic modifications incorporating genes from different
species, while intragenic GMOs involve genetic modifications incorporating genes from the same
species. See generally Marlam Sticklen, Transgenic, Cisgenic, Intragenic and Subgenic Crops,
ADVANCES CROP SCI. & TECH., Apr. 2015, at 1, http://www.esciencecentral.org/journals/
transgenic-cisgenic-intragenic-and-subgenic-crops-2329-8863-1000e123.pdf.
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modify a red tomato with genes from a grasshopper to increase bruising
resistance.
It is important to observe that the USPTO does not evaluate the safety
of an invention receiving a patent. In the past, moral considerations
played a role in the evaluation of the utility requirement.96 However, the
utility requirement’s only modern moral restriction is that the invention
must be capable of serving a lawful purpose.97 The role of the USPTO in
GMO policy is simply to promote the progress of science98 by
determining if the claimed GMO invention meets the statutory criteria to
receive a patent without considering the safety of the claimed GMO.
2. Food Safety and Human Health
The origins of the FDA can be traced back to the passage of the Pure
Food and Drugs Act in 1906.99 Today, the FDA derives its authority from
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA).100 Essentially, the
FDA regulates food safety and human health.101 It “protect[s] the public
health by assuring the safety, efficacy and security of human and
veterinary drugs, biological products, . . . [and the U.S.] food supply.”102
Specifically, the “FDA regulates the safety of substances added to
food . . . [and] how most food is processed, packaged, and labeled.”103
The FFDCA mandates a premarket approval safety assessment before
a food enters the U.S. food supply.104 The premarket approval process
begins with a petition submitted by the applicant.105 The petition must
contain adequate data to allow the FDA to conduct a chemistry review, a
toxicology review, and an environmental review prior to the FDA
approval of the food product.106 However, the FFDCA does not require
96. See Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568),
abrogation recognized by In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
97. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
99. History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/
History/ (last updated Mar. 23, 2015).
100. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 393 (2012).
101. See What We Do, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/
(last updated Dec. 7, 2015).
102. Id.
103. Ingredients, Packaging & Labeling, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Food/IngredientsPackagingLabeling/default.htm (last updated June 21,
2016).
104. See 21 C.F.R. § 171.1(h)(4) (2014) (detailing the FFDCA’s safety assessment
requirements).
105. Guidance for Industry: Questions and Answers About the Petition Process, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatory
Information/ucm253328.htm#answerC (last updated Mar. 23, 2015).
106. Id. (providing a basic overview of the petition requirements and process). The applicantprovided data includes the results from and the methodology of detailed safety studies. Id.
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a premarket approval safety assessment if the food is classified as
“generally recognized as safe” (GRAS).107 Once a food substance
qualifies as GRAS, it may enter directly into the U.S. food supply.108
In 1992, the FDA issued a policy statement regarding “Foods Derived
from New Plant Varieties,” which it reiterated in 2001.109 The policy
states that “transferred genetic material can be presumed to be GRAS.”110
The FDA also affirmed that it still holds the view that
there is unlikely to be a safety question sufficient to question
the presumed GRAS status of proteins (typically enzymes)
produced from the transferred genetic material, or of
substances produced by the action of the introduced enzymes
(such as carbohydrates, fats, and oils), when these proteins
or other substances do not differ significantly from other
substances commonly found in food and are already present
at generally comparable or greater levels in currently
consumed foods.111
Consistent with these policies, the FDA typically presumes food derived
from genetically modified plants to be GRAS and therefore does not
subject it to premarket approval safety testing.112
The FDA evaluates food additives under a more stringent safety
standard than whole foods.113 A food additive is “any substance that is
not an inherent constituent of food or whose level in food has been
increased by human intervention to be ‘added.’”114 However, a food
additive that is considered GRAS is excluded from the more stringent
safety standard.115 As a result, many food additives derived from natural
sources are considered GRAS, which allows the food additives to bypass
FDA review and enter the food supply.116 The manufacturer of a new
food product, not the FDA, makes the initial determination of whether
107. See 21 C.F.R. § 170.30 (discussing various methods of determining whether a food
substance qualifies as GRAS); id. §§ 182, 184, 186 (2014) (identifying food substances that have
been generally recognized as safe).
108. See id. §§ 170.30, 182.1, 184.1, 186.1.
109. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984,
22,989–90 (May 29, 1992). See Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed.
Reg. 4706, 4709 (Jan. 18, 2001) (reiterating the 1992 policy from the FDA Policy Statement
regarding Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties).
110. Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. at 4709.
111. Id.
112. See 21 C.F.R. § 170.30; FDA Proposed Rule, Premarket Notice Concerning
Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. at 4709.
113. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,988–
89.
114. Id. at 22,989.
115. Id.
116. See id.
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the new food product is GRAS.117
The FDA also applies different standards of review for genetically
modified plant food products and genetically modified animal food
products. As discussed above, genetically modified plant food products
are evaluated as a food substance and are presumed to be GRAS.118 When
confronted with the first genetically modified animal food product, the
FDA determined that the appropriate standard of review was to treat the
added genetic material as an animal drug, subjecting it to a much more
extensive safety testing process.119 However, the science and processes
underlying genetic modification methods, such as recombinant DNA
techniques or cell fusion techniques, are the same for both genetically
modified plants and genetically modified animals.120 The FDA stated that
the reason for the different treatment is that animals can transmit diseases
to humans, which leads to the increased safety testing requirement.121
This differential treatment means that a strawberry modified to include
fish genes could qualify as GRAS, while a fish modified to include
strawberry genes would be evaluated under the animal drug regulations.
In addition to selecting a higher standard for safety evaluation of
genetically modified animals as food products, the FDA approval process
for the first genetically modified animal food product experienced
multiple lengthy and unexplained delays.122 AquaBounty first
approached the FDA seeking approval for AquAdvantage Salmon in
1995 and did not receive approval until November 2015.123 This is in
contrast to the first genetically modified plant product, the Flavr Savr
tomato, which Calgene first mentioned to the FDA in 1991 and which
was in grocery stores by 1994.124 Perhaps these differences are solely
117. Id.
118. Id. at 22,990.
119. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REGULATION OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ANIMALS 2
(2010), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm048122.pdf.
120. Id. at 1–2.
121. Genetically Engineered Animals: General Q&A, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/GeneticEngineering/Gene
ticallyEngineeredAnimals/ucm113605.htm (last updated Nov. 19, 2015).
122. Ron Stotish, AquAdvantage Salmon: A Regulatory Odyssey, BIOTECH NOW (Apr. 24,
2013), http://www.biotech-now.org/food-and-agriculture/2013/04/aquadvantage-salmon-a-regul
atory-odyssey.
123. Heidi Ledford, Transgenic Salmon Nears Approval: Slow US Regulatory Process
Highlights Hurdles of Getting Engineered Food Animals to Dinner Tables, 497 NATURE 17, 17
(2013), http://www.nature.com/news/transgenic-salmon-nears-approval-1.12903; AquAdvantage
Salmon
Approval
Letter
and
Appendix,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/GeneticEngineering/Gene
ticallyEngineeredAnimals/ucm466214.htm (last updated Nov. 19, 2015) [hereinafter
AquAdvantage Approval Letter].
124. Memorandum from Consumer Safety Officer, Biotechnology Policy Branch on
Consultation with Calgene, Inc., Concerning FLAVR SAVR Tomatoes to Acting Dir., Office of
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because of the ability of animals to spread disease to humans, or perhaps
they are an indicator of the beginning of a shift in policy for the regulation
of genetically modified foods by the FDA.
The FDA also has other responsibilities related to food safety and
human health that are worth noting.125 One of these responsibilities is
advancing the public health “by helping to speed innovations that make
medicines more effective, safer, and more affordable.”126 Another
responsibility is “helping the public get the accurate, science-based
information . . . to use medicines and foods to maintain and improve their
health.”127 As a result, the FDA has promoted advances in biotechnology,
including genetically modified plants.128
B. USPTO and FDA Policy Comparisons
To better understand the GMO policy of the USPTO and the FDA, it
is helpful to compare the way each agency evaluates various products for
human consumption. New and naturally occurring food products,
artificial and non-naturally occurring food products, and pharmaceuticals
must typically undergo premarket approval safety testing by the FDA
before entering the U.S. market.129 This is in contrast to genetically
modified plant food products, which typically bypass the premarket
approval safety testing and enter directly into the U.S. food supply. As
discussed above, the USPTO does not consider safety when determining
whether a product is eligible for a patent. Interestingly, the FDA requires
genetically modified animal food products to undergo a much more
rigorous approval process than their genetically modified plant
counterparts. The following examples illustrate how these policies
operate in practice. For each example, assume the manufacturer is
seeking a utility patent from the USPTO and entry into the U.S. food
supply through the FDA.
1. New and Naturally Occurring
Consider the treatment of two naturally occurring food products for
which a company seeks both a patent from the USPTO and approval to
enter the food supply from the FDA. For the first scenario, consider a
newly discovered naturally occurring food product found in the wild. For
the second scenario, consider a naturally occurring food product resulting
from conventional crossbreeding of plants.
Premarket Approval (May 17, 1994), http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceResearch/
Biotechnology/Submissions/ucm225043.htm.
125. What We Do, supra note 101.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See id.
129. See 21 C.F.R. § 171.1(h)(4) (2014).
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First, imagine a team of explorers discovering a new plant in the wild
that produces yellow berries. The USPTO will determine that the plant
and its yellow berries are not patentable, as the Supreme Court has held
that “a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the
wild is not patentable subject matter.”130 The USPTO would not need to
consider the criteria of utility, novelty, and nonobviousness because the
discovery of the naturally occurring plant and yellow berries does not
meet the initial subject matter eligibility requirements of 35 U.S.C. §
101.131
To receive FDA approval, the yellow berries must undergo premarket
approval process.132 The premarket approval process mandates a safety
assessment of the food substance.133 This safety assessment must show
that the yellow berries are safe for human consumption before the yellow
berries may enter the food supply.134
There are two important exemptions to the mandated food safety
assessment.135 If the naturally occurring food product has a history of
extensive use in food prior to 1958 or published scientific evidence shows
the safety of the food product for human consumption, then the food
product can be considered GRAS.136 A food substance classified as
GRAS may enter the food supply without premarket approval safety
testing.137 In this example, neither exemption would apply because the
newly discovered yellow berries are not substantially equivalent to an
existing approved food substance.
Now, imagine a plant breeder uses manual pollination to crossbreed
two varieties of strawberry plants and the resulting plant has a heritable
trait that produces sweet purple berries. The USPTO will likely determine
that the conventionally crossbred sweet purple berries are not utility
patent eligible because they are still a product of nature, even though
manual pollination aided nature.138 Unlike the yellow berries newly
discovered in the wild, the crossbred purple berries would likely be
130. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (finding that “a new plant found
in the wild is not patentable subject matter”).
131. See 35 U.S.C. § 101–103 (2012).
132. See supra Section II.B.
133. See 21 C.F.R. § 171.1(h)(4).
134. See id.
135. See INT’L FOOD INFO. COUNCIL FOUND. & U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FOOD
INGREDIENTS & COLORS 5 (2010), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/IngredientsPackaging
Labeling/ucm094249.pdf.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 132 (1948) (finding that
no invention existed when several species of bacteria were mixed in a beneficial way). The plant
could possibly obtain protection through the PVPA, but it would not be eligible for a plant patent
because it has not been asexually reproduced. See supra Subsections I.B.2–3.
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exempt from the FDA’s premarket approval safety testing because they
would likely be substantially equivalent to a typical strawberry and
therefore classified as GRAS.
In summary, a naturally occurring food product would not be eligible
for a patent but would be subjected to the FDA’s premarket approval
process, which includes safety testing. However, naturally occurring food
products are classified as GRAS, and therefore bypass the premarket
approval process, if the naturally occurring food product has a history of
extensive use in food before 1958 or if published scientific evidence
supports the safety of the food product.139
2. Artificial or Non-naturally Occurring
Now, consider the treatment of an artificial or non-naturally occurring
food product for which a company seeks both a patent from the USPTO
and approval to enter the food market from the FDA. As an example,
consider the artificial sweetener sucralose.140 Sucralose is used as a zerocalorie sweetener.141 It is produced by subjecting naturally occurring
sugar to a chlorination process.142
The USPTO has granted numerous patents for various forms of
sucralose.143 Sucralose meets all of the statutory requirements for
patenting.144 The artificial sweetener satisfies the subject matter
eligibility requirement.145 The utility requirement146 is met by the zerocalorie characteristic of the sweetener, which makes it useful to
individuals who want to reduce their caloric intake and to diabetics who
are unable to consume natural sugar.147 When sucralose was invented, it
was new and met the novelty requirement.148 Sucralose also passed the
last hurdle presented by the nonobviousness requirement. At the time of
the invention, it would not have been obvious that subjecting sugar to a
chlorination process would result in a zero-calorie sweetener that is much
sweeter than the original sugar.149
139. INT’L FOOD INFO. COUNCIL FOUND. & U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 135, at 5.
140. See U.S. Patent No. 4,801,700 cols. 2 l. 65 to 3 l. 6 (filed Oct. 20, 1986) (issued Jan. 31,
1989) (describing patent claims for a sucralose process).
141. What
Is
SPLENDA®
Brand
Sweetener
(Sucralose)?,
SPLENDA,
http://www.splenda.com/faq/no-calorie-sweetener (last visited June 25, 2016) [hereinafter What
Is Splenda].
142. Id.
143. See U.S. Patent No. 6,646,121 col. 2 l. 45–48 (filed Nov. 16, 2001) (issued Nov. 11,
2003) (containing citations to additional granted U.S. patents for various forms of sucralose).
144. See id. cols. 3–8 (demonstrating the patentability of sucralose compositions).
145. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); MPEP § 2106 (9th ed., Mar. 2014).
146. See 35 U.S.C. § 101; MPEP § 2107.
147. What Is Splenda, supra note 141.
148. See 35 U.S.C. § 102; MPEP § 2131.
149. See 35 U.S.C. § 103; MPEP §§ 2141–2144.
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The FDA classifies sucralose as a food additive.150 During the
approval process, the FDA reviewed more than 110 safety studies of
sucralose.151 The FDA notes that Sucralose has been extensively studied
by others and is approved as a general-purpose sweetener in food under
certain conditions of use.152 Sucralose was not classified as GRAS
because it was not substantially equivalent to sugar as indicated by the
difference in caloric content and other characteristics.153
In summary, an artificial or non-naturally occurring food product is
eligible for a patent but is subjected to the FDA’s premarket approval
process, which includes safety testing. The only exception to the
premarket approval process is GRAS classification. An artificial or nonnaturally occurring food product is less likely to be considered
substantially equivalent and therefore less likely to be classified as
GRAS.
3. New and Generic Pharmaceuticals
Consider the development of a new pharmaceutical. A new
pharmaceutical typically is granted a utility patent if the pharmaceutical
meets the criteria of novelty, nonobviousness, and utility. A manufacturer
seeking approval to sell a new pharmaceutical must complete many steps
to demonstrate the safety and effectiveness of the drug.154 Initially, tests
are conducted in the laboratory and on animals.155 If these tests indicate
the drug is safe enough to be tested in humans, the manufacturer submits
an Investigational New Drug Application that the FDA reviews prior to
the human testing.156 The FDA monitors three phases of human clinical
trials of the drug.157 Finally, the records from all of the testing are
submitted in a New Drug Application, which experts at the FDA
review.158 The FDA only approves the new pharmaceutical if the known
benefits of its proposed use outweigh the known risks.159
150. Food Additives & Ingredients: High-Intensity Sweeteners, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(May 19, 2014), http://www.fda.gov/Food/IngredientsPackagingLabeling/FoodAdditives
Ingredients/ucm397716.htm.
151. Additional Information About High-Intensity Sweeteners Permitted for Use in Food in
the United States, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Food/
IngredientsPackagingLabeling/FoodAdditivesIngredients/ucm397725.htm (last updated May 26,
2015).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See How FDA Evaluates Regulated Products: Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm269834.htm (last updated June 25,
2016).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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By contrast, a generic pharmaceutical is ineligible for patent
protection but enjoys an abbreviated FDA approval process. When a new
pharmaceutical is developed, it typically has the protection of a utility
patent.160 Once the patent expires, generic versions of the pharmaceutical
are made. Patent protection is not available for a generic pharmaceutical
because the generic will fail the novelty requirement of patent eligibility.
A generic pharmaceutical by its nature intends to be a copy of the original
and not a new pharmaceutical.161 The active ingredients must be the same
in the original and the generic pharmaceuticals; however, the inactive
ingredients may vary.162 Additionally, to qualify as a generic
pharmaceutical, the use indications must be the same as the original
pharmaceutical.163 The FDA only requires an abbreviated new drug
application for approval to market a generic pharmaceutical. 164 The
generic pharmaceutical manufacturer is not required to conduct the
animal or clinical research on ingredients or dosage forms required of the
original pharmaceutical manufacturer because those steps would be
duplicative and unnecessary.165
4. Genetically Modified Plants as Food
Now consider a plant that has been genetically modified using new
methods, such as recombinant DNA techniques or cell fusion techniques,
to include modification that would not be possible with traditional
breeding methods. For example, a genetically modified plant created
using recombinant DNA techniques to transfer genetic material from
certain genes in fish, which encode proteins that increase resistance to
cold, into an agricultural crop such as strawberries.166 Clearly a fish and
a strawberry are not sexually compatible and could not be crossbred using
traditional methods. A strawberry genetically modified by inserting fish
genetic material would be patent-eligible subject matter under the
160. TONY ELLERY & NEAL HANSEN, PHARMACEUTICAL LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT: MAKING
THE MOST OF EACH AND EVERY BRAND § 8.10 (2012).

161. See Generic Drugs: Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.
fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/QuestionsAnswers/ucm100100.htm (last updated
Jan. 7, 2015).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. In 1991, the DNA Plant Technology Corporation published a paper describing
transgenic tomato plants that were modified by inserting a gene from the northern-hemisphere
winter flounder to produce antifreeze proteins. See Robin Hightower et al., Expression of
Antifreeze Proteins in Transgenic Plants, 17 PLANT MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 1013, 1013 (1991).
The transgenic tomatoes never made it to the marketplace after further research was unsuccessful
in developing a cold-resistant tomato. Peggy G. Lemaux, Genetically Engineered Plants and
Foods: A Scientist’s Analysis of the Issues (Part I), 59 ANN. REV. PLANT BIOLOGY 771, 777, 779
(2008).
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reasoning from Chakrabarty, which found that the genetic alteration by
man was sufficient to overcome the restriction on patenting products of
nature.167 The new strawberry’s increased resistance to cold is sufficient
to meet the utility requirement.168 The USPTO will grant a utility patent
as long as the requirements of patentability, including novelty and
nonobviousness, are met.169
The FDA has stated a presumption of GRAS status for foods derived
from genetically modified plants.170 As long as the new strawberry does
not contain an increased level of a naturally occurring toxicant or a new
unexpected toxicant and as long as it has a similar nutritional profile to a
typical strawberry, the manufacturer is likely to determine that the new
strawberry is GRAS.171 No weight is given to the fact that it would be
impossible to traditionally crossbreed a strawberry with a fish.172 Once
the new strawberry is determined to be GRAS, it bypasses the FDA
review process and can enter the food supply.173
In summary, a food product derived from a genetically modified plant
will likely obtain a utility patent, and the manufacturer will likely classify
it as GRAS. The GRAS status allows the food product to bypass the FDA
review process. The FDA states that it “has rarely had occasion to review
the GRAS status of foods derived from new plant varieties because these
foods have been widely recognized and accepted as safe.”174
5. Genetically Modified Animals as Food
Now consider an animal that has been genetically modified using new
methods, such as recombinant DNA techniques or cell fusion techniques,
to include modification that would not be possible with traditional
breeding methods. For this example, consider AquAdvantage Salmon,
the first genetically modified animal for which a manufacturer has sought
FDA approval.175 AquAdvantage Salmon has genetic modifications that
cause an Atlantic salmon to produce its growth hormone year-round
rather than producing the growth hormone only during a short period each

167. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980).
168. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
169. See id. §§ 102–103.
170. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984,
22,989–90 (May 29, 1992).
171. See id. at 22,987, 22,990.
172. See id. at 22,990.
173. See id.
174. Id.
175. An Overview of Atlantic Salmon, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/VeterinaryMedicineAd
visoryCommittee/ucm222635.htm (last updated Mar. 20, 2015).
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year.176 The result is AquAdvantage Salmon, which has the potential to
grow to maturity in half the time as a naturally occurring Atlantic
salmon.177 Just as a genetically modified plant is eligible for a utility
patent, a genetically modified animal is eligible for a utility patent.178
The FDA evaluates food derived from genetically modified animals
differently than it evaluates food derived from genetically modified
plants.179 Genetically modified animals and food products derived from
them are evaluated under a New Animal Drug Application (NADA).180
Essentially, the inserted genetic material is treated as an “animal drug”
for the animal being genetically modified.181 This evaluation process
requires a much more extensive safety review by the FDA.182 If approved
under a NADA, a post-market surveillance program is put in place to
monitor for any unforeseen safety issues that arise.183
On November 19, 2015, the FDA announced the approval for
AquAdvantage Salmon.184 The FDA approval is subject to conditions of
use which include specific manufacturing methods, facilities, and
controls. Only two facilities, neither of which are located in United States,
are approved to produce, raise, and harvest AquAdvantage Salmon.185
The approval provides detailed specifications for physical containment,
breeding procedures, testing requirements, and shipment logistics.186
Additionally, the approval contains recordkeeping and reporting
requirements which mandate the documentation of adverse events along
with product and manufacturing defects, and require detailed periodic
drug experience reports and special drug experience reports.187
In summary, a genetically modified animal as a food product is
capable of receiving utility patent protection but is subject to a much more
176. Frequently Asked Questions, AQUABOUNTY TECHS., http://aquabounty.com/pressroom/frequently-asked-questions/ (last visited June 25, 2016).
177. Id.
178. See Transgenic Mice Expressing Human Insulin, U.S. Patent No. 6,018,097, at [57]
(filed Apr. 11, 1995) (issued Jan. 25, 2000).
179. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. CTR. FOR VETERINARY MED., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:
REGULATION OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ANIMALS CONTAINING HERITABLE RECOMBINANT
DNA
CONSTRUCTS
10–11
(2011),
http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/Guidance
ComplianceEnforcement/Guidancefor Industry/default.htm.
180. Id. at 6.
181 . See Genetically Engineered Animals: General Q&A, supra note 121.
182. See id.
183. Id.
184. See Genetically Engineered Animals: AquAdvantage Salmon, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/GeneticEngineer
ing/GeneticallyEngineeredAnimals/ucm280853.htm (last updated Apr. 7, 2016) (stating the
current status of the FDA approval process for AquAdvantage Salmon).
185. AquAdvantage Approval Letter, supra note 123.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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extensive review by the FDA than a food derived from a genetically
modified plant.188 The review under NADA requires safety testing and a
post-market surveillance program to evaluate the safety of a food derived
from a genetically modified animal.189 As demonstrated by the nearly two
decade approval process and the detailed post-market conditions of use
required for AquAdvantage Salmon, the FDA is clearly treating
genetically modified animal food products differently from their
genetically modified plant food product counterparts.
These examples illustrate the unique roles of the USPTO and FDA in
GMO policy. The USPTO grants patent protection for novel inventions,
such as GMOs, to promote scientific progress. The FDA protects human
health through food safety regulations, which include the approval of
food products entering the U.S. food supply. However, the FDA does not
consider the impact of utility patent protection on a food product’s
availability for independent food safety testing.
III. THE LACK OF INDEPENDENT FOOD SAFETY TESTING
FDA GMO policy, in combination with GMO manufacturer licensing
restrictions, makes it very difficult to identify the end products containing
specific genetically modified food products and nearly impossible to
isolate a specific genetically modified food product for safety testing.
This combination results in an effective block to independent food safety
testing. This has created a special “hidden novelty” exception where the
non-naturally occurring component of a manufactured food product not
only makes the food product eligible for a utility patent but also results
in the lack of access for independent food safety testing for which food
products are otherwise available. Manufacturers use the protective power
of the utility patent through license agreements to prevent any
independent testing or safety research of the patented GMO.
A. The Special “Hidden Novelty” Exception
Many criticisms of the FDA’s regulation of GMOs exist.190 While
critics have made many valid points, this Note limits its focus to the
critical absence of independent food safety testing for GMOs protected
by utility patents. One factor the FDA does not consider in its guidance
for evaluating food safety is the accessibility of the food product for

188. See Genetically Engineered Animals: General Q&A, supra note 121.
189. See id.
190. See, e.g., Maria R. Lee-Muramoto, Reforming the "Uncoordinated" Framework for
Regulation of Biotechnology, 17 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 311, 313 (2012) (criticizing the regulation of
GMOs); Mandel, supra note 15, at 2233 (same); see also Angelo, supra note 8, at 95–98
(proposing a new evolutionary biology model for regulating GMOs).
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independent food safety research.191 The current regulatory framework
instead allows the manufacturer to determine the appropriate level of
review for the food product that it seeks approval for based upon guidance
issued by the FDA.192 By ignoring the implications of utility patent
protection, the FDA’s current regulatory framework effectively removes
the ability for most genetically modified foods to be independently tested
for safety.
The missing food safety protection of independent safety testing is
brought to light by considering the implications and interactions of the
protection a utility patent provides a food product and the ability to
identify the food product in the marketplace. In most instances, it is legal
to conduct independent research and testing on a food product.193
Independent testing is permissible in four general situations. First, it is
permissible where a food product lacks utility patent protection. In this
case, a manufacturer is unable to use the exclusion power of a utility
patent to prevent an independent researcher from making, using, or
testing the food product.194 Second, it is permissible where a legal
exemption for research exists. In this case, an independent researcher is
able to conduct testing on a food product even if the testing would
otherwise be prohibited.195 Third, it is permissible where a food product
is easily identifiable in the marketplace. For example, where a food
product is either available as a whole food or clearly labeled, an
independent researcher is able to identify and purchase the food product
in the marketplace and conduct testing on the specific food product.
Fourth, it is permissible where a food product is sold rather than licensed.
In this case, an independent researcher is able to purchase and use the
food product free of restrictions which allows for independent testing.196
However, when none of these situations exist, a food product is not
available for independent testing. A utility patent granted to a food
product provides the right to exclude others, does not provide a legal
research exemption, and allows for the food product to be licensed rather
than sold. When a utility patent protected food product is incorporated
into a processed food product with multiple ingredients, in varying ratios,
and without labeling, it is not easily identifiable in the marketplace. As a
result, a utility patent protected food product is able to effectively “hide”
191. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984,
22,990 (May 29, 1992).
192. Id. at 22,989–91.
193. See, e.g., Carey Gillam, Fears over Roundup Herbicide Residues Prompt Private
Testing, REUTERS (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-food-agriculture-glyphosateidUSKBN0N029H20150409.
194. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2012).
195. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (2012) (stating the research exemption provided in the Plant
Variety Protection Act).
196. See infra Section III.B (discussing the power of patent licensing).
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from independent safety testing.
The FDA’s blindness to the implications of utility patent protection
creates what this Note calls a “hidden novelty” exception. The “novel”
feature of a food product results in utility patent protection. This novel
feature is “hidden” from the FDA guidance and evaluation process. The
FDA does not “see” a difference between the patented food product and
its naturally occurring counterpart. The resulting “exception” allows the
manufacturer to use the utility patent protection, through licensing
restrictions, to prevent any independent food safety research while
complying with FDA guidance and bypassing the premarket approval
safety assessment. Therefore, the “hidden novelty” exception allows the
manufacturer to use the novelty of its invention to maintain full control
over any food safety testing of its patented product.
The narrowness of this special “hidden novelty” exception is
exemplified by the previous examples comparing USPTO and FDA
policy for various food product categories.197 Naturally occurring food
products will not have utility patent protection.198 Additionally, if the
PVPA protects a naturally occurring food product, there is a legal
exemption specifically for independent research activities.199 Nonnaturally occurring food products, such as sucralose, typically have utility
patent protection.200 However, the product will be easily identifiable
through food labeling in the marketplace, and the product is sold rather
than licensed, making it available for independent testing. Utility patentprotected pharmaceuticals, which are subject to extensive testing
requirements by the FDA,201 are easily identified by labeling in the
marketplace.
GMO manufacturers use the protection of a utility patent, including
licensing,202 combined with a lack of food labeling to identify the
genetically modified products in the marketplace to prevent access to
GMO food products for independent research. The narrow “hidden
novelty” exception applies to GMOs. The utility patent gives the patent
owner the right to exclude others from using or testing, including safety
testing, the patented product. No legal exemption permits independent
research for any reason. The lack of food labeling and the mixing of GMO
food products in the food supply make it nearly impossible to identify a
specific GMO food product in the marketplace. GMO manufacturers only

197. See supra Section II.B.
198. See supra Subsection II.B.1.
199. 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (2012).
200. See supra Subsection II.B.2.
201. See supra Subsection II.B.3.
202. See infra Section III.B (explaining how a utility patent is used to block the ability of
independent research on GMOs).
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license the food producing organism to growers for commercial crops.203
The effect of this special “hidden novelty” exception from
independent testing grows when a GMO food product is classified as
GRAS. A manufacturer’s initial determination that its genetically
modified plant food product is GRAS causes a three-fold effect. First, the
food product can enter the food supply without going through the FDA’s
premarket review process. Second, the FDA is unlikely to challenge the
manufacturer’s GRAS determination because of the GRAS presumption.
Third, the manufacturer can prevent any independent testing through its
utility patent protection. The only safety testing that occurs is any testing
the manufacturer grants permission for or voluntarily chooses to
undertake.
B. The Power of Patent Licensing
The power of utility patent protection, combined with the licensing
agreements used by patent owners of genetically modified plant
technology, has granted a monopoly not only over the patented
technology but also over the research and testing of the raw ingredients
in the U.S. food supply.204 The license agreement, often called a
“stewardship agreement,” requires the farmer to agree to several
restrictions including: (1) to only use the seed products for a single
commercial crop, (2) to not allow another person or entity to have any
seed products for any purpose, (3) to not save any grain produced from
seed products for planting by anyone, and (4) to not use or allow others
to use the seed products, the grain produced, the licensed technologies,
or any plant material containing the licensed technologies for crop
breeding, research (including for testing or generating data to compare
against similar non-licensed technologies), or seed production unless the
patent owner has expressly authorized the activity through a written
agreement.205
In 2013, the Supreme Court held in Bowman v. Monsanto206 that the
replanting of a patented seed without the patent holder’s permission
constitutes patent infringement because the new plant replicates the
patented invention.207 This holding affirmed the patent owner’s right
203. See infra Section III.B.
204. See Rowe, supra note 11, at 882–87 (identifying the overreach of patent protection and
discussing the implications of that overreach).
205. See, e.g., SYNGENTA SEEDS, INC., STEWARDSHIP AGREEMENT (June 5, 2013),
http://www3.syngenta.com/country/us/en/agriculture/Stewardship/Documents/SyngentaSteward
shipAgreement.pdf.
206. 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013).
207. Id. at 1769. In Bowman, the Court noted that its holding was limited to a person taking
an active step to make replicas of a patented product and not applicable to a case where the selfreplication occurred outside the control of a person. Id.
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prevent seed replanting but did not address the license’s research
restriction.208 The Court has not had the opportunity to address the
validity of the license provision prohibiting independent research.209
A license restriction that directly prohibits independent testing
combined with a commercial crop limitation make it incredibly difficult,
if not impossible, to use end food products for independent research. The
commercial crop limitation results in genetically modified plant products
mixing in with other crop strains at a grain mill before being sold for use
in food products.210 The FDA does not require labeling of food containing
genetically modified plant products, adding to the difficulty of identifying
the end food products containing a specific genetically modified plant
product.211 Genetically modified plant products are typically found in
processed products containing multiple ingredients, making it practically
impossible to identify and isolate a specific genetically modified food
product to conduct reliable and high-quality independent research.212
The additional monopoly of the patent owner controlling the
independent research of genetically modified plant products raises
serious concerns. This monopoly, coupled with the difficulty of
identifying genetically modified plant products in end food products,
creates a tort liability issue.213 Without the ability to identify which
products contain a genetically modified plant product, an injured party
would face an immense challenge in establishing causation for any injury
attributed to genetically modified plant products.214 Exploration of the
tort liability issues is beyond the scope of this Note, but others have
discussed it.215

208. See id.
209. Rowe, supra note 1130, at 872–74.
210. See Van Tassel, supra note 10, 1662.
211. Id. at 1655.
212. See id. at 1662.
213. See Van Tassel, supra note 10, at 1645–48. Some simplified examples of the types of
injuries that could result are health-related injuries, such as allergic reactions or the development
of cancer. Id.
214. The injured party likely has no way of knowing how much or even if he ever consumed
a specific GMO. The challenge of establishing causation increases for latent injuries such as
cancer. See Albert C. Lin, Beyond Tort: Compensating Victims of Environmental Toxic Injury, 78
S. CAL. L. REV. 1439, 1446–47 (2004). The longer an injury takes to develop, the longer the victim
is exposed to other possible causes. See id.
215. See, e.g., Noah, supra note 9, at 53–60 (warning against inappropriate legal action and
overregulation of new technology); Van Tassel, supra note 10, at 1646–47 (identifying and
proposing a solution to a tort immunity problem); see also David G. Owen, Bending Nature,
Bending Law, 62 FLA. L. REV. 569, 572–73 (2010) (discussing the foreseeability of unexpected
harmful consequences as science and technology rapidly advance).
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IV. THE REQUIREMENT OF ACCESS
It is critical that the components of the U.S. food supply be accessible
for independent safety testing. Discoveries that appear harmless and seem
to be perfect solutions can in fact turn out to have dire consequences. It
can take years before the harmful effects are fully realized or detectable.
These latent and difficult-to-detect effects are why independent research
is needed. Reliance on manufacturers to investigate and detect possible
harmful effects of a food product for the length of a patent term is
inefficient and not in the public interest. An access requirement for food
safety testing on all food products and raw ingredients in the U.S. food
supply is the best solution. It enables independent research while keeping
patent law precedent intact and intrusion on a utility patent owner’s
intellectual property rights to a minimum.
A. Trans Fat Historical Lesson
Learning from past experiences can help avoid future mistakes. The
new technological advances of genetic modification have the immense
potential to be incredibly beneficial to society. Genetically modified food
products promise higher crop yields and a more nutritious food supply to
feed the world’s ever-growing population—two advancements critical in
the fight to end world hunger. The development of a product with such
promise should be encouraged and supported. However, access for
independent research must also be permitted as an added check on the
safety of the food supply.
The United States has experience with a promising product that
seemed to be the perfect solution to many problems but later proved very
dangerous to human health. Trans fat was the first man-made fat included
in the U.S. food supply.216 The most common source of trans fat is
partially hydrogenated vegetable oil.217 Trans fat first entered the U.S.
food supply in 1911 when Procter & Gamble introduced Crisco.218 Trans
fat became particularly important by the 1980s, when it was well
established that saturated fats were unhealthy.219 In response to consumer
advocacy groups, food manufacturers and many fast-food restaurants
switched from using saturated fats to using partially hydrogenated oils.220

216. See David Schleifer, The Perfect Solution: How Trans Fats Became the Healthy
Replacement for Saturated Fats, 53 TECH. & CULTURE 94, 100–01 (2012).
217. Id. at 94.
218. See id. at 100.
219. See id. at 109.
220. See id. at 109–15.
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The FDA considered partially hydrogenated oil GRAS because it had a
history of extensive use in food prior to 1958 with no known problems.221
Partially hydrogenated vegetable oil has many beneficial
characteristics that produce desirable traits in food products.222 For
example, adding hydrogen atoms to an oil molecule increases the stability
and solid characteristic of the oil.223 The result is an oil that creates
consistent texture, tenderness, and aeration in baked goods.224 The oil
also gives products a longer shelf life before the oil turns rancid.225 The
oil can be formulated to be a solid at room temperature, such as in a cake
frosting to ensure the frosting adheres to the cake and yet literally melts
in the consumer’s mouth.226 The oil has a higher smoke point than natural
fats and oils, so when used as fryer oil, it reduces both smoke and the
frequency that the fryer oil needs to be changed.227 Additionally, the oil
can be customized for many different uses, does not have a strong taste
that affects flavor, and is kosher.228 Partially hydrogenated vegetable oil
seemed to be the perfect solution to common cooking problems in many
ways.229
Trans fat was very useful in producing a wide variety of food products
with desirable characteristics, but it was unclear what health effects trans
fat would have over time. Independent research conducted in the 1990s,
however, revealed a correlation between trans fat consumption and
increased risk for heart disease.230 In 2006, the FDA began requiring food
labels to list the amount of trans fat in the product.231 Previously, a
consumer had to read the ingredient list in search of partially
hydrogenated oil to determine if a food product contained any trans fat.
The food industry responded by significantly reducing the use of partially
hydrogenated oils in food products.232 In November 2013, the FDA
announced that it had “made a preliminary determination that partially
hydrogenated oils . . . are no longer . . . GRAS.”233 The Center for
Disease Control estimated that eliminating partially hydrogenated oils
221. See Dan Charles, FDA Moves to Phase out Remaining Trans Fats in Food Supply, NPR:
THE SALT (Nov. 7, 2013, 3:48 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2013/11/07/243730263/fdamoves-to-phase-out-remaining-trans-fats-in-food-supply.
222. See id.; Schleifer, supra note 216, at 105–06.
223. Charles, supra note 221.
224. Schleifer, supra note 216, at 105.
225. Id.
226. See id. at 105–06.
227. Id. at 106.
228. Id. at 105–06.
229. Id. at 99.
230. See Charles, supra note 221.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, FDA FACTS: QUESTIONS & ANSWERS REGARDING TRANS
FATS 1 (2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/PopularTopics/UCM385846.pdf.
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“could prevent 10,000–20,000 heart attacks and 3,000–7,000 coronary
heart disease deaths each year” in the United States.234 In June 2015, the
FDA made a final determination that partially hydrogenated oils are not
GRAS and provided a three-year compliance period for manufacturers to
eliminate the use of partially hydrogenated oils.235
Trans fat has many beneficial and wonderful characteristics for a chef
working in a kitchen; however, what seemed to be the “perfect solution”
in many ways was actually more harmful than the animal fats and oils it
replaced.236 The harmful effects of trans fat took decades to realize and
may never have been identified without independent researchers. Even
after researchers discovered the drawbacks of trans fat, it still took
approximately another decade, the FDA requiring the addition of details
on trans fat to food labels, and public awareness of trans fat health risks
for the food manufacturers to significantly reduce their use of partially
hydrogenated oil. More than eight years later, the FDA finally determined
partially hydrogenated oil is not GRAS for any use in human food.
The independent researchers studying the effects of trans fat had the
advantage of expired patents coupled with food labels listing the
ingredient of partially hydrogenated oil. Consumers had the advantage of
being able to avoid consuming partially hydrogenated oil by reading food
labels if they had any concerns or uncertainty about its safety. The history
of trans fat shows how it can take years to detect the harmful effects of a
seemingly perfect food product.
Independent researchers face a much different scenario in conducting
research on GMOs. Without the permission of the patent owner,
researchers must wait until the patent term expires to begin any research
on a food product in the U.S. food supply, creating up to a two-decade
delay.237 Technology is evolving rapidly, and newly patented GMOs will
replace the older GMOs as they become available for research. 238 Any
harmful effects from consumption of GMOs will likely be latent effects
that take a long time to detect and identify.239 The current utility patent
protection and licensing agreements used by GMO manufacturers forces

234. U.S. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, TRANS FAT: THE FACTS 1 http://www.cdc.gov/
nutrition/downloads/trans_fat_final.pdf.
235. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA CUTS TRANS FAT IN PROCESSED FOOD 1 (2015),
http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm372915.htm.
236. Trans fats were found to be more harmful than saturated fat because trans fat
simultaneously increased the bad cholesterol and lowered the good cholesterol, whereas saturated
fat only increased the bad cholesterol. See id. at 2.
237. See 35 U.S.C. 154(a)(2) (2012) (defining the patent term as twenty years).
238. Roundup Ready Soybean Patent Expiration, MONSANTO NEWSROOM, http://www.mon
santo.com/newsviews/pages/roundup-ready-patent-expiration.aspx (last visited June 25, 2016).
239. The manufacturer will likely detect any immediate harmful effects, such as the
production of a toxin, during development.
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a nearly twenty-year delay on independent research on food products that
make up raw ingredients in the U.S. food supply.
B. Patent Law Policy
Plants should remain patent-eligible subject matter for utility patents.
There is a strong line of support from Supreme Court decisions for the
utility patent eligibility of plants, beginning with Chakrabarty in 1980,
followed by J.E.M. Ag Supply in 2001, and most recently with Bowman
in 2013. There is no need to disturb this line of precedent in addressing
the issue of access to GMOs for independent research. History clearly
demonstrates that GMOs deserve utility patent protection because they
can meet the stringent requirements of utility patent eligibility. An
entirely new and important use is incorporated into an existing food
source. Rather than completely removing the protection of a utility patent,
it is possible to enable access through other means such as a research
exemption for independent food safety research.
A utility patent subject to a research exemption would still provide
more protection to the patent owner than a PVP certificate issued under
the PVPA. This proposal parallels the Court’s reasoning in J.E.M. Ag
Supply that “[b]ecause it is harder to qualify for a utility patent than for a
Plant Variety Protection (PVP) certificate, it only makes sense that utility
patents would confer a greater scope of protection.”240 The PVPA
contains exemptions for saving seed and for research.241 A utility patent
subject to a research exemption would still provide the additional
protection of prohibiting the saving of seed. This protection provides a
significant financial incentive for the patent owner that is not available
under the PVPA. The utility patent owner profits from the sale of the seed
to each grower for every crop year rather than profiting only from the
initial sale of seed to a grower, who then saves enough seed to replant
crops the following year.
Access to GMOs for independent research can be achieved without
disturbing the patent eligibility of GMOs. An access requirement for
independent food safety research could be legislated or judicially created
for patented food products. An access requirement would provide a great
public benefit by providing an additional safety check for the U.S. food
supply, and a utility patent would still provide more protection than a
PVP certificate. The FDA is the ideal agency to implement an access
requirement for independent food safety research.

240. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 138 (2001).
241. Id. at 140.
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C. FDA Policy
The FDA should require any food product in the U.S. food supply to
be available for independent food safety research. Allowing independent
research on products in the U.S. food supply benefits public safety and
does not significantly harm the intellectual property interests of the patent
owners. FDA policy should create an access requirement for independent
food safety research. The FDA must consider the implications of utility
patent protection on the ability to conduct independent research on a food
product.
At a minimum, the FDA could require access to a patented food
product for independent food safety research in order for a food to qualify
for GRAS status. By prohibiting GRAS status, the food product would
then be subject to the premarket approval safety testing. While this would
not create access for independent safety research, it would at least require
the manufacturer to do significant additional testing before the food
product could enter the food market. It is also possible that the
manufacturer would voluntarily choose to make its product available for
independent safety research to obtain GRAS status—perhaps through a
limited use license allowing independent safety research that prohibits
competitive research—to avoid the added time and expense of the
premarket approval safety testing.
However, even if GMOs were subject to the FDA’s premarket
approval process, the patent owner can still block independent food safety
research. The public is left to rely solely on the FDA for safety testing of
the food product, and the FDA in turn relies on the manufacturer for
safety testing. A manufacturer’s concern for financial gain could be
greater than its concern for food safety. A utility patent protecting the use
of a food as a pesticide or herbicide should not make it illegal to test the
food independently for safety.
The FDA should require any food product in the United States to be
available for independent food safety research. In exchange for the
benefit of the ability to sell the patented product or the food derived from
it in the U.S. food market, the FDA should require a manufacturer to
allow access to the patented product for independent food safety research.
The FDA would not violate the patent owner’s rights because the patent
owner is free to choose not to participate in the U.S. food market.
Implementation of an access requirement is a realistic solution that would
allow independent researchers to access GMOs for safety testing.
CONCLUSION
It is imperative that independent researchers have access to GMOs for
food safety research. GMOs are an immensely promising technology with
many possible benefits for not only the United States but also for the
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world’s food supply. However, the current combination of utility patent
protection, licensing agreements, and the extreme difficulty in identifying
a specific genetically modified ingredient in an end product has created a
special “hidden novelty” exception for food products. This exception
results in patent protected food products being unavailable for
independent food safety testing. Ironically, the characteristics of a
genetically modified food product must be different enough from the
naturally occurring form of the food productto meet the stringent
requirements of a utility patent, but the utility patent provides the power
to prevent any independent testing of such a novel food product because
the food product is considered GRAS.
The special “hidden novelty” exception that prevents access to GMOs
for independent testing shouldbe corrected. This exception creates a
problematic and lengthy delay in the ability to conduct independent
research on raw ingredients in the U.S. food supply. It places the control
of safety testing solely in the hands of the manufacturer of the GMO for
nearly two decades. Correction is easily accomplished with an access
requirement for any food product in the U.S. food supply. The patent
owner would still retain significantly more protection than through the
PVPA by being able to prevent any seed replanting by farmers, Supreme
Court precedent would remain intact, and GMOs would be available for
independent research just like other products in the food supply.
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